These land equity issues are deep rooted in South Africa’s colonial past and its history marked by the racially oppressive system of Apartheid. When the regime of Apartheid came to a close in 1994 as the nation began its transition to democracy, the racially motivated injustices of the past were influencing the present. Within the text of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, lies the legal ground upon which EWC is built. It states: that “[a] person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.” Additionally, the Constitution allows for expropriation, however, it is subject to compensation. Hence, the push for a Constitutional amendment to change this.
​
        So is EWC a good thing? Though it may be well intentioned, EWC carries the potential to bring disaster to South Africa. Historically, EWC has lead to economic hardship. Zimbabwe passed land reform policies allowing for EWC in 2000 and has since faced many negative economic repercussions. These negative economic impacts are largely attached to investor confidence. EWC may lead investors, both domestic and foreign, to doubt the stability of their property rights and thus they may choose to leave. Investor flight, is only one of the negative economic impacts. The economy is also intertwined with global politics. Alliances may shift due to this critical change in policy. Due to the frightening precedent of Zimbabwe, there is a real concern that EWC could bring to economic and political ruin to South Africa. However, despite the risks attached to the proposed policy, there still is support for it. But what causes this support? What characteristics are attributed to those who favor EWC? By using Google Trends data, we can attempt to construct stories of the factors which may be contributing to support for EWC.
​

What are Google Trends?

        Before delving into the particular mechanisms of the proposed research design, it is important to understand what Google Trends is and what data it offers. Google Trends is a free and publicly available Google service which provides data on the search volume of different queries across time and space. Users choose particular terms, words or phrases and are allowed to specify time periods and regions of interest and Google Trends will produce a graph of the relative search term frequency within the specified parameters. Google Trends sometimes also offers data on further regional levels. For example, if one were to research how often people searched Elon Musk in the United States over the past three months, Trends also provides information on which states had the highest search volume in comparison to others. This search volume is measured in relative terms with 100 signifying the greatest term search frequency. This means that the peak of the graph will always be 100 which signifies the point at which the particular search term was most searched.
This is best illustrated through an example. With the search term “Matthew McConaughey” (specified as the American Actor), the following trend line (Figure 2) was produced for the United States in 2018.

by: Devon Hsiao, Lillian Mauldin, and Savannah Whitmer

Intro
In February 2018, Cyril took office as the President of South Africa. During the same month, the South African National Assembly passed a motion to review Section 25 of the Constitution, also known as the ‘Property Clause’. The national debate on land reform takes place in the context of a history of land displacements dating back to 1913, when the colonial government passed the Native Lands Act that allocated only 7% of land to Africans, as well as rising unemployment rates in the country.

There are many differing opinions on the state of land reform in South Africa. A 2017 report published by the Institute for Race Relations indicates that most black South Africans are less concerned with land issues than they are with job creation and unemployment. The Economic Freedom Fighters party (EFF) in South Africa currently advocates for the nationalization of all land, whereas the African National Congress (ANC) party advocates for a more specific, law-based approach to evaluating what land should be retaken. The ANC currently appears to support some form of expropriation without compensation (EWC), a process in which the government reclaims land without compensating the property owners, as opposed to a governmental buy back of land at a fair market price. The ANC also positions EWC as an economic move, whereas the EFF utilize racial rhetoric when discussing land reform.

As the debate continues in South Africa on whether to adopt a policy of EWC, we are interested in foreign reactions to the situation. Specifically, what causes foreign actors to take a stance on EWC?

Shadow timeline overview
A number of international actors and officials have taken explicit stances on South African EWC. The first documented official statement on this issue was made on February 28th, 2018, by Janice Atkinson, a member of the European Parliament. She tweeted pictures of a letter addressed to Boris Johnson, a UK Member of Parliament, in which she accused EFF leader Julius Malema of “[encouraging] farm terror and murder.” She went on to emphasize that “The British government has a duty to South Africa” and “as a commonwealth member, it is our duty to step in and mediate.”

Almost four months later, on June 12th, the IMF said that “the South African government should clearly articulate its land reform plans in order to lift uncertainty weighing on investor sentiment” and “the government’s stated priorities of strengthening governance and promoting employment presented an opportunity to accelerate economic growth momentum.” However, on August 30th, the IMF “gave its full backing to South Africa’s land reform plan... as long as the highly contentious process is transparent and based on the constitution.”

The tidal wave came on August 22, 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted out a racially charged disapproval of EWC. In the tweet, Trump asked Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to “closely study the South Africa land and farm seizures and expropriations and the large scale killing of farmers.” The tweet also included a quote from Fox News stating that the “South African Government is now seizing land from white farmers.” The South African Government Twitter page offered a quick rebuttal less than four hours later, stating firmly that “South Africa totally rejects this narrow perception which only seeks to divide our nation and reminds us of our colonial past… @realDonaldTrump.”

Unsurprisingly, media outlets took to the web to offer both facts about South African EWC and subjective analysis of Trump’s tweet. Additionally, a slew of international political officials issued statements in the following days and weeks. On August 23rd, just a day after Trump’s tweet, Australian Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton displayed concern for white South African farmers, stating “If you look at the footage and read the stories, you hear the accounts, it’s a horrific circumstance they face.”

Five days later On August 28th came British Prime Minister Theresa May’s statements on South African EWC. At a speech in Cape Town, she proclaimed “The UK has, for some time now, supported land reform that is legal, transparent, and follows a democratic process.” This endorsement came alongside her promise of £4 billion in investment for Africa’s economy, security, and young people.

May’s statements were followed by endorsements from China’s President Xi Jinping and Belgium’s  Foreign Affairs Minister Didier Reynders. Promises of more economic investment were made by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. However, Russian Stavropol government liaison Vladimir Poluboyarenko delivered an underhanded criticism of EWC as he began planning immigration trips to Russia for white South Africans. The South African government also received pushback from former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who warned of a supposed detriment to foreign investment under EWC.

Our hypothesis
Looking at the types of actors taking explicit stances on EWC in South Africa and what they are saying, we hypothesize that political actors that are vulnerable domestically are more likely to take a public stance on EWC. To evaluate our hypothesis, we look at the case of Theresa May and the United Kingdom.

In July 2016, Theresa May became the Prime Minister of the UK following the contentious Brexit referendum. In her role as PM, she was charged with the task of negotiating the terms of the UK’s exit from the EU. Part of her strategy appears to be engaging with partners outside of the EU, including in Africa; an October 2017 UK government white paper on the future of trade emphasized relationships with developing countries. In accordance with this apparent policy to focus on developing countries, May and Ramaphosa met in London in April 2018, where they agreed on a £50 million deal over the next four years to “identify and dismantle barriers to trade”.

In August 2018 on an “African Trade Mission” to South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria, May publicly came out in support of Ramaphosa and “legal” land reform in South Africa. The fact that in July 2018, a month before her trip, May’s approval ratings hit a record low, indicates that our hypothesis might be correct, and that domestic political vulnerability impacts whether a political actor takes a public stance on EWC.

Details on TM's Africa trade proposals
From 2010 to 2015, the United Kingdom’s investment in Africa fell from £50 billion ($63.8 billion) to £42.5 billion ($54.2 billion). As Britain’s investment dropped, China and the United States’ investment skyrocketed. But in August 2018, on her three day trip to South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, UK Prime Minister Theresa May declared that she intended to boost the UK’s investment in Africa and become the largest investor in the continent out of the Group of Seven countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US) by 2022. Though her statement was tempered by the acknowledgement that the UK may not be able to match either China or the US in terms of “economic might,” she promised stable, long-term opportunities of the “highest quality and breadth”.

In the wake of Brexit and the UK’s impending March 2019 withdrawal from the European Union, May has been transparent about her intention to find an alternative trade and investment source in Africa. On her August trip, May made clear her proposal, which includes an increase in bilateral trade with several countries. This proposition affirms that established trade relations from European Union-era agreements will remain in place, as the UK currently invests billions each year in countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Sudan. However, May proposed a shift in funding from aid to trade and expressed her intention to focus on long term economic relationships instead of short term poverty-reduction funding.

May committed the UK to spending its £13.9 billion development budget in the best interest of both African economies and British companies, affirming the need to set up formal, systematic trading terms to promote private British investment. In August, she remarked, “I am unashamed about the need to ensure that our aid programme works for the UK. So today I am committing that our development spending will not only combat extreme poverty, but at the same time tackle global challenges and support our own national interest.” Economic analysts have surmised that her overarching strategy functions as an effort to publicize the UK’s global investment interests.

This plan was imperative to May’s trade mission in August, where she began in Cape Town by pledging £4 billion ($5.1 billion) direct investment to African economies, remarking that she expects these investments to be matched by the private sector. The stop in Cape Town held particular weight, as South Africa has the continent’s second largest economy and is Britain’s largest export market in Africa. In April 2018, when South African president Cyril Ramaphosa visited the UK, the leaders agreed that the UK would provide £50 million to South Africa over the course of the next four years in the hopes of creating jobs, reducing poverty, and attracting potential investors, including British companies. The agreement was an asset to Ramaphosa, who is seeking $100 billion in investments over the next five years.

Conclusion
With a rejected Brexit deal, a vote of no confidence, and a March 29th deadline looming, May faces continued political instability. Her approval ratings as well as cooperation from her own Conservative party are under threat, leading us to believe she will turn to other avenues of political support. Our hypothesis suggests a likelihood that May will push to increase foreign investment in South Africa and continue to publicly display her support for EWC. However, with the publishing of a controversial Expropriation bill in December and the upcoming 2019 general election, Ramaphosa and his party likely face upcoming political instability as well. Considering the trying Parliamentary circumstances for both May and Ramaphosa, the formation of a symbiotic relationship of investment and political backing seems entirely possible in the coming months.

​

I raised over $4,500, or 292,000 Rupees by reaching out to friends, family, and local businesses in the Indian community in Austin and found incredible support. We bought the machine and had it transported to Dityakhedi, Rajasthan, near where my father grew up. My family then went to India to help set up the machine and hold educational discussions with the young women of the villages about puberty, menstruation, and menstrual hygiene, which was all nonexistent in their school curriculum. The education piece was my favorite part. We used the Hindi Menstrupedia video resources and Hindi brochures we made from scratch. After we brought the information to the girls, we then opened the conversation and discussed these topics. They asked so many questions and really seemed receptive to the information. In our first trip, we visited 4 different villages and discussed with about 150 girls. After those discussions, we knew we had to continue. That’s how The MAHI (Menstrual Awareness and Hygiene in India) Project came to be. Because of this, I was chosen as one of the top ten outstanding Gold Award projects in the country, earning the National Young Woman of Distinction Award and Scholarship, which opened even more doors for me.  ​​

After a year, however, I had gotten a bit older and wiser, and I learned that my initial approach had many flaws. The machine was not being used to its full capacity in Rajasthan, and I did not want it to fall into disuse. I realized that this wasn’t a failure, but rather a learning opportunity and a first step in a very long journey where we’re constantly trying to improve. We made the decision to move the machine to Kerala, in South India, where we worked with low-income school to partner with a group of unemployed women and create an ongoing initiative using the machine. This past March, my family visited one more time to take the educational piece to 5 different schools in the rural parts of Lucknow. There, we asked the girls if they talked to their moms or sisters about their periods or if they knew why periods happened, the girls shook their heads “no.” I knew that the even the educational piece was making a huge impact on the girls. ​

The power of networks is a central interest for the Global Indices Network Project. We deconstruct indices of global ratings and rankings in order to study their connections and relationships, which reveal information about the power of the indices within the network. How linkages form in this network of indices, how many times an index is used in the creation of another index, and how much weight the information from one index holds in another index are some questions we address.

What does the networked power of global indices really mean for the GIN Project? For the purposes of our research, networked power has a much broader meaning than simple linkages between indices. These connections matter, but more generally, we are most interested in the indices’ power to influence the structure of other indices, as well as their power to change actions of real-life actors. Different conceptual measures of how an index influences the network can be found both within and from outside the immediate network of deconstructed indices. The directionality and overall connections within the network may constitute an index’s power; its ability to generate attention and to affect actors outside of the network space may also lend to its influence. These concepts of power are discussed in more detail below, with some examples from our preliminary network.

​
​Within the Network
At the base, the networked power of global indices comes from the density of connections that an index has to other indices. That is, the more connections that an index has, the more relative power it holds in the networked ecosystem of global indices. This is related to the network concept of degree. In the collapsed network of our first batch of deconstructed indices, the Worldwide Governance Indicators - Rule of Law had the highest degree (the most connections with other indices, regardless of direction) at a total of 19 connected paths with other indices.

However, it is not simply the number of connections that matter in our network - the directionality of a connection is even more important. In terms of our network, in-degree comes from the number of connections other indices borrow from a certain index, and out-degree comes from the number of connections an index borrows from other indices. The Global Competitiveness Index had the highest in-degree, with 17 other indices that borrowed from it.  This could be an example of what we are looking for in a “powerful” index. If there is a change in the quantitative value or the methodology of such a highly connected index with a high in-degree, all the other indices that are connected – dependent – on that index will be affected, and a ripple effect will occur in the network. Meanwhile, if an index has high out-degree, it would be susceptible to changes in  indices that it borrows from. The Worldwide Governance Indicators - Voice and Accountability had the highest out-degree with 18 connected paths. This means that it borrows from (and is prone to being affected by changes in) 18 other indexes.

Eight years ago I moved to Tanzania to teach at a failing international school. This past summer, I went back to Tanzania to carry out my own research. It felt amazing to be back in a country that I love. I had the opportunity of working as a research intern for 10 weeks at Ubongo in Dar-es-Salaam. I spent my time assisting with finding curriculum resources, helping to write curriculum for episodes, being a soundboard to the full time staff with early childhood related items and lastly, I was able to carry out my own research that I designed. 

My two research questions were 1) What are children’s attitudes on gender and gender roles? and 2) Can Ubongo Programming serve as an intervention? These question emerged because I believe and research also shows that cultural norms that stratify boys and girls are still alive and well in Tanzania. Additionally, Tanzanian society is largely patriarchal and women are socialized to become homemakers and child-bearers and less value is placed on their economical and educational attainment. This also means women and girls are less represented. This history puts women in the roles of being submissive and men to be stronger and dominant. My focus is to disrupt this. 

The research design was created by me with language and cultural support provided by three full-time Ubongo staff. This research could not have happened without them and the autonomy I was given, so I am forever appreciative of that. The research design was simple and child-friendly. I created three different activities that served as both the pre-test and post-test. The activities included drawing, a survey and storytelling. The responses to the activities provided insight into what children thought about gender roles and the possibilities of boys and girls. After the pre-test activities, children watched five short Ubongo episodes over the course of two days. The same activities where administered again for the post test after the children watched the episodes. 
Findings from my pre-test study revealed that both boys and girls believed 1) a girl can never grow up and be President, 2) a girl will grow up to be a woman whose main job is to have children and take care of the household and 3) jobs are gendered and a girl can only have specific jobs (i.e hairdresser, selling food on the street and or being a teacher). Their responses portrayed the emotional, financial and physical vulnerability that girls face in East Africa. Additionally, the data revealed that girls internalize these norms more than boys and seem more challenging to shift. The post test showed a shift in thinking: 1) maybe boys and girls can grow up to have similar jobs, 2) a man should also help around the house, and 3) women are just as strong as men and can be stronger. 

I feel proud of what I did in Tanzania with Ubongo because it showed me the work that still needs to be done and what is possible. Additionally, it reaffirmed my desire to pursue this opportunity with Ubongo because the work they are doing is clearly changing mindsets and opening up opportunities for change. My work is inspired by a vision of Black girls being able to live and exist freely but I realize this work cannot be done without chipping away at masculinity and hetero and patriarchal beliefs that are bigger than just gender. My findings helped me realize how socioeconomic status, cultural history, religion and etc. can be at play in concert with one another. This realization has helped be even more curious and read more, so maybe I can return to Tanzania for the 3rd time and do something even bigger and better. 

This post was written by IPD Research Affiliate Jill Baggerman. ​Jill is a first year student in the Master's of Global Policy Studies program at the LBJ School of Public Affairs. She focuses on water policy in peace-building contexts. Her most recent work was at the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), where she focused on peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan and Liberia. Baggerman also has some experience in local peacebuilding and development efforts in northern Uganda and Bihar, India.

What can be done in Syria with its extreme levels of physical and social destruction? How can the international community begin to assist given the overwhelming need? How can peacebuilding and development begin under these circumstances?
 
Peacebuilding is considered to set the conditions necessary for eventual development. Peacebuilding is holistic in aims, focusing on creating a durable peace by addressing all root causes to the conflict. Peacebuilding practitioners focus on societal structures—physical, social, and political structures—to facilitate reconstruction of a conflict-afflicted nation.
 
Development is comparatively more fine-tuned to improve the livelihoods of a population. Increasingly, development agencies aim to improve human development, which incorporates healthcare, education, equality, and other social factors. Many of these goals are measured in the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI).
 
Because Syria’s conflict has not affected the nation equitably, development and peacebuilding efforts will be complex. They cannot be easily categorized on a linear timeline with peacebuilding leading to development. Both are needed simultaneously.
 
In this article, I draw on data for human development and statistics on how the conflict has affected Syrian populations to make a case for where in Syria and what kind of development-oriented initiatives could most lead to a peacebuilding outcome.

Overview of Syria 

Syria is a war-torn country in the Middle East bordering the Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. Islamic State (ISIS) claimed Syria as the center of their Caliphate in 2014, terrorizing the people and expounding the civil war which began in 2011. The urban population is 58.5% and the total population is estimated at over 18 million. Currently, those living under or near the poverty line—the working poor at purchasing power parity (PPP) living on less than $3.10/day—is 34.8% of the population.
 
Syria is in the lowest tier of human development, ranked 149th out of 188 on the HDI. The civil war and violence from ISIS are significant socio-economic challenges, though even before the war, Syria was ranked with a medium HDI at 111th in the world. Few countries have experienced this degree of a sudden drop in HDI.
 
Although contributing factors of low development in Syria are multidimensional, all factors are exacerbated by the war.

Syria’s Situation is Complicated 

ISIS is well-known for planting land mines and their destructiveness. It is just being realized though that while they gripped power, they provided services typically considered the responsibility of the state. In several cases, ISIS provided public services more efficiently than the Syrian government had before them.
 
This severely complicates peacebuilding efforts and damages the government’s perceived legitimacy.
 
Because of this, in some cases, such as healthcare and education, development in regions of Syria must be restored to pre-war conditions before it can be further improved. In other cases, such as electricity provision, development in regions of Syria must, uncannily, be restored to war-time conditions.

Where to Focus within Syria?
 
I conducted a country-wide analysis of various livelihood indicators to determine which governorates (provinces) of Syria could be prioritized in peacebuilding and development initiatives. Key indicators considered were categorized as:
●     the population in need of humanitarian assistance,
●     multidimensional poverty rankings,
●     internally displaced persons,
●     education and literacy statistics,
●     unemployment rates,
●     poverty indicators,
●     percent of the population relying on agriculture and intermittent employment,
●     improved drinking water and sanitation access,
●     malnutrition rates.
Within these categories, 46 governorate-level statistics were found and compared. Other indicators were sought, but the lack of reliable governorate-level data required me to exclude them in the analysis. Most recent statistics were used in each available case.
 
When indicators were compared, the governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor rose to the surface as in the most need of initiatives. For instance, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor had the highest multidimensional poverty rankings within the country in 2009.
  
                                                             Comparison of Indicators Across Governorates

I then evaluated the specific development and peacebuilding needs of these governorates to determine what priorities were most likely to contribute toward a durable peace there. In this evaluation, data indicates that as soon as land mines are cleared, the restoration of livelihoods will depend on repairing healthcare, water and sanitation access, and agricultural systems.

Livelihood Security 

Water and Sanitation Country-wide
 
Before the war, access to improved water and sanitation was as high as 87.3%, however, ISIS intentionally contaminated water sources as a war tactic. At various points in the conflict, in different places (including all major cities), and by both ISIS and the government, access to potable water was restricted or cut off. While household level studies are yet to be updated, nongovernmental organizations and UNICEF have noted that half of the population most in need of water and sanitation are children.
 
Water and Sanitation in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor
 
Water system improvement is critical for healthcare and livelihoods. Water contamination in the Euphrates River has reportedly increased levels of typhoid and hepatitis A in Syria. 75% of the 2,600 cases of typhoid from January-July of 2014 were in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Much of the nation’s water contamination seems to have come from when the ISIS controlled the Tabqa Dam, upstream from Raqqa, beginning in 2013. Conflict in Raqqa has also damaged governorate water systems, leaving communities to rely on boreholes and modifying their hygiene practices to accommodate for reduced water volume and quality. Unlike other governorates, Raqqa’s irrigation system was centralized, leaving Raqqa particularly vulnerable to the damaged infrastructure.
 
Agriculture and Food Security Country-wide
 
Nongovernmental and governmental organizations are assessing what impacts the war has had on the agricultural sector. From preliminary reports it appears that ISIS sustained and possibly even improved agricultural production. However, continued production potentially came at the cost of increased ethnic division because ISIS stole land from non-Sunni populations and sold it to Sunnis. These reports also indicate that Shi’a or Kurds have returned to agricultural lands to find damaged canals and broken equipment. Determining land equitable and proper land ownership will be a key challenge in long-term agricultural production.
 
Agriculture and Food Security in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor
 
Both governorates rely on the agricultural industry for food and livelihood security. Before the war, 62.3% of Deir ez-Zor’s workforce and 52.2% of Raqqa’s was employed in agriculture. Economic security was low in the governorates. Total unemployment in Deir ez-Zor in 2012 was 23.5% (the second highest rate in the country) and for Raqqa it was 21.9%.
 
The nation increasingly relies on irrigated agricultural land because of prolonged droughts and irregular precipitation. Since the war, most governorates have increased their irrigated areas, but because of deteriorated and damaged irrigation systems, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor have decreased irrigated areas—Raqqa from 110,000 hectares in 2015 to 92,000 in 2017 and Deir ez-Zor from 70,000 to 65,000 respectively.
 
Health and Nutrition
 
Before the conflict, access to healthcare was adequate. Severely or moderately undernourished children stood at 9.7%. The majority, 87.7%, of children were fully immunized. Recently, the infant mortality rate was reported as low as 14.8 deaths/thousand live births, though the maternal mortality ratio measured higher, at 68 deaths/thousand live births.
 
However, rates of malnutrition were staggering in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Before the war, the governorates ranked first and second in the nation for highest rates of chronic and acute malnutrition. Raqqa also ranked second and Deir ez-Zor third for highest stunting rates in the country in 2006, with rates that are nearly unbelievable (see table below). Wasting rates in Deir ez-Zor were the highest in the country and Raqqa’s were also dangerously among the highest nationally. All this is despite the region being among the highest agricultural producing governorates in the country.

                                                 Percentages of Malnutrition Rates Among Under-five Children

Source: United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) “Syrian Arab Republic: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey,” February 2008.
 
Healthcare During the War
 
With large swaths of the country at war, healthcare facilities operated at high capacity and in dire circumstances. Aid workers increasingly consider that hospitals and medical professionals are intentionally targeted.
 
By 2013, over 15,000 of Syria’s 30,000 doctors had fled the country. 5 of the 7 main health care centers in Raqqa were operating at limited capacity by 2014, when only 13 (of formerly 23) primary health centers remained open. Raqqa National Hospital, the only medical facility with dialysis services in Raqqa governorate, was severely damaged in 2014 and by 2017 provided no services. By that time, public health systems in Deir ez-Zor were operating at 5% of required capacity with chronically short staff and supplies.
​
Recommendations for NGOs and Others 

To address these challenges, partnering NGOs and governments will need to be multidimensional and multi-sector in their activities. Cross-cutting issues to be addressed include out-migration, violence and personal safety, conflict sensitivity, drought and climate change, and participation in government.
 
Improved Food Security
 
One of the first needs is improved food security which can come from the ability to resume agricultural production. Development organizations and national partners could work with demining groups to identify what agricultural lands are already safe for resumed production. They could also link farmers with local authorities to select and prioritize additional demining locations.
 
NGOs may also consider food for work programs to repair irrigation systems and canals. They could also conduct trainings simultaneously on ethno-religious cooperation, conflict sensitivity, and the creation of a cooperative regional irrigation system. Such an initiative would target both the infrastructural and social needs of the governorates.
 
Improved Healthcare
 
Another need, with great potential, is increased availability of medical personnel and access to healthcare. Organizations which work with refugees and internally displaced persons should identify and work with the 15,000 Syrian medical personnel who fled to determine what conditions would best quicken their return. Would they require safe houses near or within hospitals, for instance? Or could convoys be organized to facilitate their return?
 
NGOs and governmental partners should additionally create programs to improve the damaged medical facilities of the governorates. They could again utilize food for work programs to repair the physical infrastructure and partner with medical-specific organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, for provisions of medical equipment.
 
Again, development agencies could simultaneously aim to address long-standing social issues in Syria while aiming to increase access to trained medical personnel. For instance, they could engage in community education on the importance of women and caregivers being medically trained and provide information on how they can seek higher education in healthcare. Some organizations may even consider gathering resources to provide EMT training to women and caregivers currently in refugee or internally displaced persons camps of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.
 
Improved Water and Sanitation Access
 
Necessary for both livelihoods and healthcare is improved water access for consumption and agriculture. Governmental and nongovernmental partners in Syria’s development and peacebuilding processes should consider how they can contribute to increased access to decontaminated or otherwise potable water on the household level. They could also train community members on how to test water quality in their area.
 
Water quality levels necessary for agricultural lands need not be as high as for household consumption. Nonetheless, organizations should also work with farmers and water engineers to identify decontamination methods appropriate for irrigation. For instance, NGOs could train farmers on how to test irrigable waters for pH, total soluble salts, sodium hazard (SAR), and toxic ions.

Conclusion 

In post-conflict, development efforts can be an avenue to restore the damaged social trust among populations. Likewise, peacebuilding efforts can and should be incorporated into reconstruction and development initiatives.
 
Improving food security, healthcare, and access to water and sanitation in these recommended ways will not provide an elusive magical solution. Furthermore, the need for these things must be reevaluated with local and returning Syrians in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The data simply indicates that these are among the most severe of needs within the least developed of the governorates of Syria. Prioritizing these sectors can thus uniquely provide needed development and peacebuilding services.
 
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Mona Yacoubian, "Governance Challenges in Raqqa after the Islamic State," United States Institute of Peace, October 2017.
Omer Karasapan, "The War on Syria's Health System," Brookings Institute, February 23, 2016.
Rukmini Callimachi, “The ISIS Files,” New York Times, April 4, 2018.
"Selected Definitions of Peacebuilding," Peacebuilding News, Alliance for Peacebuilding, August 12, 2013.
“Syrian Arab Republic and FAO: Building Resilience and Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security”,” January 2018.
"Syria's Medical Community Under Assault," Physicians for Human Rights, October 2014.
 “Syria Population 2018,” World Population Review, 2017.
“The World Factbook: Syria,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified April 9, 2018.
Tobias von Lossow, "Water as Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris: the systematic instrumentalisation of water entails conflicting IS objectives," German Institute for International and security affairs, January 2016.
United Nations Children’s Fund, “Running Dry: Water and Sanitation Crisis Threatens Syrian Children,” Relief Web, February 8, 2013.
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) “Syrian Arab Republic: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey,” February 2008.
Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, "The Greatest Threat to People Returning to War-ravaged Raqqa: ISIS Mines," The Defense Post, October 20, 2017.

This post was written by IPD Research Affiliate Sebastian DeBeurs. Sebastian is a third year student in Plan II Honors and Government. His interests lie in developmental policy, political psychology, and poverty alleviation - especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. This past summer, Sebastian was a foreign service intern at the US Department of State in the Bureau for African Affairs.

Through the Bill Archer Fellowship, I have had the opportunity to work in Washington D.C. as an intern at the Aspen Network for Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE).
 
ANDE is a solid network of development organizations, corporates, banks, universities, and other organizations that support entrepreneurship and small and growing businesses (SGBs) in developing nations. SGBs are formal firms that employ between 5 and 250 employees with a strong potential for growth (ANDE, 2010). SGBs play a critical role in entrepreneurship-driven international development, generating sustainable employment as small businesses and local economies grow. The wealth generated by small and growing businesses often stays within the community, spurring the growth of other businesses and cultivating a self-sustaining private sector over the long run.

Entrepreneurship in developing nations is especially important to closing the gender gap. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 26% of women aged 18 to 64 in are entrepreneurially engaged (GEM, 2017). And of these female entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 36% cite “necessity” as a motive to start a small business or engage entrepreneurially (GEM, 2017). There are a range of reasons that necessitate entrepreneurship, including the exclusion of women from male-dominant professions or the necessity to generate additional income to sustain personal livelihood and that of families.
 
While critical to local economic development and female empowerment, SGBs face several challenges in the developing world. To fulfill their growth potential, SGBs often seek between $20,000 and $2 million in investment capital (ANDE, 2010). Yet these enterprises are often too small to access the capital, knowledge, and networks they need to scale, and too large to receive microfinance and seed funding, if there is any available in the first place. This creates a “missing middle” of investment capital in which SGBs in developing nations cannot access the adequate resources required for growth.
 
This is why the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) is bringing together diverse actors from across the world to empower SGBs. By supporting entrepreneurs and small businesses in developing nations, organizations in the ANDE network put the agency for economic development in the hands of entrepreneurs and small business owners. Rather than outside actors dictating what works, this way of conducting international development trusts entrepreneurs to build businesses and generate their own economic solutions to their local economies.

Sources: 

Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) 2010 Impact Report. The Aspen Institute. 2011
Donna J. Kelley et al. Women’s Entrepreneurship Report 2016-2017. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). 2017

As we wrap up one more year with IPD, let's learn more about our dedicated students. Jenny has been with us since 2015!
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1. What is your year and major at UT?
I am an incoming senior at UT majoring in Plan II, International Relations and Global Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies, minoring in Arabic.

2. How long have you been in IPD and how did you hear about the organization? Are you part of a specific team within IPD?
I joined IPD in the fall of 2015 on the Conflict and Development team, and have recently been working with the Open Aid Team. I heard about IPD from Vishal Duvvuru, a fellow classmate of mine from a class we had together about NGOs and Terrorism. He could tell I was really interested in aid projects in conflict stricken zones, and suggested I join IPD. My experience in the organization has really helped me explore these interests Vishal saw I had, and I am so thankful he introduced me to IPD.

3. What is the most rewarding part of contributing and being an active member of IPD? Have you faced any challenges while working in IPD?
The most rewarding part of being actively involved in IPD are the people I've been able to work with, and the skills I've learned from data workshops. There aren't a lot of opportunities for undergraduate students to work and collaborate with students and faculty from LBJ, but I have had incredible mentors over the past three years that have taught me so much, namely Raheem Chaudhry and Caleb Rudow. It's also amazing to be able to learn skills in OpenRefine, R, STATA, Excel, GIS, etc. without taking a semester long class; it's helped me with so many projects in IPD and even in my classes. The only challenge I would say I've faced in IPD is being an undergrad surrounded by so many successful and intelligent graduate students. They have more experience with field work, jobs, and are more narrowly studying the things we discuss in IPD - it can be a little intimidating at times. This challenge has definitely helped me grow as a student and researcher interested in aid, governance, and security.

4. How does your work with IPD relate to your career goals?
My future career goals are pretty wide, but IPD definitely relates to all these interests I hope to pursue. I either hope to work with a development aid agency, the state department in international security affairs, or with an IGO related to foreign aid projects and security. I have a strong passion about effective, long term, and sustainable aid in conflict stricken zones, and IPD is preparing me to make an impact in this field by analyzing what makes foreign aid effective. This summer I'll be living in Amman, Jordan, and will be working with the non-profit Souriyat Across Borders. I'll be volunteering with Syrian Refugees and will help them develop a summer curriculum for their aid projects in Amman. I'll be using skills that I learned from IPD lectures and workshops to build this curriculum, and can't wait to see what more I learn to bring back to IPD in the fall.