This post was written by IPD Research Affiliate Jill Baggerman. ​Jill is a first year student in the Master's of Global Policy Studies program at the LBJ School of Public Affairs. She focuses on water policy in peace-building contexts. Her most recent work was at the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), where she focused on peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan and Liberia. Baggerman also has some experience in local peacebuilding and development efforts in northern Uganda and Bihar, India.

What can be done in Syria with its extreme levels of physical and social destruction? How can the international community begin to assist given the overwhelming need? How can peacebuilding and development begin under these circumstances?
 
Peacebuilding is considered to set the conditions necessary for eventual development. Peacebuilding is holistic in aims, focusing on creating a durable peace by addressing all root causes to the conflict. Peacebuilding practitioners focus on societal structures—physical, social, and political structures—to facilitate reconstruction of a conflict-afflicted nation.
 
Development is comparatively more fine-tuned to improve the livelihoods of a population. Increasingly, development agencies aim to improve human development, which incorporates healthcare, education, equality, and other social factors. Many of these goals are measured in the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI).
 
Because Syria’s conflict has not affected the nation equitably, development and peacebuilding efforts will be complex. They cannot be easily categorized on a linear timeline with peacebuilding leading to development. Both are needed simultaneously.
 
In this article, I draw on data for human development and statistics on how the conflict has affected Syrian populations to make a case for where in Syria and what kind of development-oriented initiatives could most lead to a peacebuilding outcome.

Overview of Syria 

Syria is a war-torn country in the Middle East bordering the Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. Islamic State (ISIS) claimed Syria as the center of their Caliphate in 2014, terrorizing the people and expounding the civil war which began in 2011. The urban population is 58.5% and the total population is estimated at over 18 million. Currently, those living under or near the poverty line—the working poor at purchasing power parity (PPP) living on less than $3.10/day—is 34.8% of the population.
 
Syria is in the lowest tier of human development, ranked 149th out of 188 on the HDI. The civil war and violence from ISIS are significant socio-economic challenges, though even before the war, Syria was ranked with a medium HDI at 111th in the world. Few countries have experienced this degree of a sudden drop in HDI.
 
Although contributing factors of low development in Syria are multidimensional, all factors are exacerbated by the war.

Syria’s Situation is Complicated 

ISIS is well-known for planting land mines and their destructiveness. It is just being realized though that while they gripped power, they provided services typically considered the responsibility of the state. In several cases, ISIS provided public services more efficiently than the Syrian government had before them.
 
This severely complicates peacebuilding efforts and damages the government’s perceived legitimacy.
 
Because of this, in some cases, such as healthcare and education, development in regions of Syria must be restored to pre-war conditions before it can be further improved. In other cases, such as electricity provision, development in regions of Syria must, uncannily, be restored to war-time conditions.

Where to Focus within Syria?
 
I conducted a country-wide analysis of various livelihood indicators to determine which governorates (provinces) of Syria could be prioritized in peacebuilding and development initiatives. Key indicators considered were categorized as:
●     the population in need of humanitarian assistance,
●     multidimensional poverty rankings,
●     internally displaced persons,
●     education and literacy statistics,
●     unemployment rates,
●     poverty indicators,
●     percent of the population relying on agriculture and intermittent employment,
●     improved drinking water and sanitation access,
●     malnutrition rates.
Within these categories, 46 governorate-level statistics were found and compared. Other indicators were sought, but the lack of reliable governorate-level data required me to exclude them in the analysis. Most recent statistics were used in each available case.
 
When indicators were compared, the governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor rose to the surface as in the most need of initiatives. For instance, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor had the highest multidimensional poverty rankings within the country in 2009.
  
                                                             Comparison of Indicators Across Governorates

I then evaluated the specific development and peacebuilding needs of these governorates to determine what priorities were most likely to contribute toward a durable peace there. In this evaluation, data indicates that as soon as land mines are cleared, the restoration of livelihoods will depend on repairing healthcare, water and sanitation access, and agricultural systems.

Livelihood Security 

Water and Sanitation Country-wide
 
Before the war, access to improved water and sanitation was as high as 87.3%, however, ISIS intentionally contaminated water sources as a war tactic. At various points in the conflict, in different places (including all major cities), and by both ISIS and the government, access to potable water was restricted or cut off. While household level studies are yet to be updated, nongovernmental organizations and UNICEF have noted that half of the population most in need of water and sanitation are children.
 
Water and Sanitation in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor
 
Water system improvement is critical for healthcare and livelihoods. Water contamination in the Euphrates River has reportedly increased levels of typhoid and hepatitis A in Syria. 75% of the 2,600 cases of typhoid from January-July of 2014 were in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Much of the nation’s water contamination seems to have come from when the ISIS controlled the Tabqa Dam, upstream from Raqqa, beginning in 2013. Conflict in Raqqa has also damaged governorate water systems, leaving communities to rely on boreholes and modifying their hygiene practices to accommodate for reduced water volume and quality. Unlike other governorates, Raqqa’s irrigation system was centralized, leaving Raqqa particularly vulnerable to the damaged infrastructure.
 
Agriculture and Food Security Country-wide
 
Nongovernmental and governmental organizations are assessing what impacts the war has had on the agricultural sector. From preliminary reports it appears that ISIS sustained and possibly even improved agricultural production. However, continued production potentially came at the cost of increased ethnic division because ISIS stole land from non-Sunni populations and sold it to Sunnis. These reports also indicate that Shi’a or Kurds have returned to agricultural lands to find damaged canals and broken equipment. Determining land equitable and proper land ownership will be a key challenge in long-term agricultural production.
 
Agriculture and Food Security in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor
 
Both governorates rely on the agricultural industry for food and livelihood security. Before the war, 62.3% of Deir ez-Zor’s workforce and 52.2% of Raqqa’s was employed in agriculture. Economic security was low in the governorates. Total unemployment in Deir ez-Zor in 2012 was 23.5% (the second highest rate in the country) and for Raqqa it was 21.9%.
 
The nation increasingly relies on irrigated agricultural land because of prolonged droughts and irregular precipitation. Since the war, most governorates have increased their irrigated areas, but because of deteriorated and damaged irrigation systems, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor have decreased irrigated areas—Raqqa from 110,000 hectares in 2015 to 92,000 in 2017 and Deir ez-Zor from 70,000 to 65,000 respectively.
 
Health and Nutrition
 
Before the conflict, access to healthcare was adequate. Severely or moderately undernourished children stood at 9.7%. The majority, 87.7%, of children were fully immunized. Recently, the infant mortality rate was reported as low as 14.8 deaths/thousand live births, though the maternal mortality ratio measured higher, at 68 deaths/thousand live births.
 
However, rates of malnutrition were staggering in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Before the war, the governorates ranked first and second in the nation for highest rates of chronic and acute malnutrition. Raqqa also ranked second and Deir ez-Zor third for highest stunting rates in the country in 2006, with rates that are nearly unbelievable (see table below). Wasting rates in Deir ez-Zor were the highest in the country and Raqqa’s were also dangerously among the highest nationally. All this is despite the region being among the highest agricultural producing governorates in the country.

                                                 Percentages of Malnutrition Rates Among Under-five Children

Source: United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) “Syrian Arab Republic: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey,” February 2008.
 
Healthcare During the War
 
With large swaths of the country at war, healthcare facilities operated at high capacity and in dire circumstances. Aid workers increasingly consider that hospitals and medical professionals are intentionally targeted.
 
By 2013, over 15,000 of Syria’s 30,000 doctors had fled the country. 5 of the 7 main health care centers in Raqqa were operating at limited capacity by 2014, when only 13 (of formerly 23) primary health centers remained open. Raqqa National Hospital, the only medical facility with dialysis services in Raqqa governorate, was severely damaged in 2014 and by 2017 provided no services. By that time, public health systems in Deir ez-Zor were operating at 5% of required capacity with chronically short staff and supplies.
​
Recommendations for NGOs and Others 

To address these challenges, partnering NGOs and governments will need to be multidimensional and multi-sector in their activities. Cross-cutting issues to be addressed include out-migration, violence and personal safety, conflict sensitivity, drought and climate change, and participation in government.
 
Improved Food Security
 
One of the first needs is improved food security which can come from the ability to resume agricultural production. Development organizations and national partners could work with demining groups to identify what agricultural lands are already safe for resumed production. They could also link farmers with local authorities to select and prioritize additional demining locations.
 
NGOs may also consider food for work programs to repair irrigation systems and canals. They could also conduct trainings simultaneously on ethno-religious cooperation, conflict sensitivity, and the creation of a cooperative regional irrigation system. Such an initiative would target both the infrastructural and social needs of the governorates.
 
Improved Healthcare
 
Another need, with great potential, is increased availability of medical personnel and access to healthcare. Organizations which work with refugees and internally displaced persons should identify and work with the 15,000 Syrian medical personnel who fled to determine what conditions would best quicken their return. Would they require safe houses near or within hospitals, for instance? Or could convoys be organized to facilitate their return?
 
NGOs and governmental partners should additionally create programs to improve the damaged medical facilities of the governorates. They could again utilize food for work programs to repair the physical infrastructure and partner with medical-specific organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, for provisions of medical equipment.
 
Again, development agencies could simultaneously aim to address long-standing social issues in Syria while aiming to increase access to trained medical personnel. For instance, they could engage in community education on the importance of women and caregivers being medically trained and provide information on how they can seek higher education in healthcare. Some organizations may even consider gathering resources to provide EMT training to women and caregivers currently in refugee or internally displaced persons camps of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.
 
Improved Water and Sanitation Access
 
Necessary for both livelihoods and healthcare is improved water access for consumption and agriculture. Governmental and nongovernmental partners in Syria’s development and peacebuilding processes should consider how they can contribute to increased access to decontaminated or otherwise potable water on the household level. They could also train community members on how to test water quality in their area.
 
Water quality levels necessary for agricultural lands need not be as high as for household consumption. Nonetheless, organizations should also work with farmers and water engineers to identify decontamination methods appropriate for irrigation. For instance, NGOs could train farmers on how to test irrigable waters for pH, total soluble salts, sodium hazard (SAR), and toxic ions.

Conclusion 

In post-conflict, development efforts can be an avenue to restore the damaged social trust among populations. Likewise, peacebuilding efforts can and should be incorporated into reconstruction and development initiatives.
 
Improving food security, healthcare, and access to water and sanitation in these recommended ways will not provide an elusive magical solution. Furthermore, the need for these things must be reevaluated with local and returning Syrians in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The data simply indicates that these are among the most severe of needs within the least developed of the governorates of Syria. Prioritizing these sectors can thus uniquely provide needed development and peacebuilding services.
 
Works Cited

"Ar-Raqqa City, Syria: Situation Overview V," REACH, September 25, 2017.
BBC, “Syria Country Profile,” British Broadcasting Company, February 7, 2018.
BBC, “Syria Profile – Timeline,” British Broadcasting Company, February 7, 2018.
Bethan McKernan, "Isis ‘Destroys Thousands of Years of Culture Almost Overnight’ as it Flees Iraqi Army Near Mosul," The Independent, 15 November 2016.
Central Bureau of Statistics of Syria (CBS), "Employment Indicators by Economical Activity," 2006, accessed April 18, 2018.
Central Bureau of Statistics of Syria (CBS), "Rate Unemployment by Governorates and Labor Force," 2012.
Central Bureau of Statistics of Syria (CBS) and UNICEF, "Multidimensional Poverty in Syria: A Comparative Research 2001, 2009," June 2014.
“Country Profile: Syrian Arab Republic,” The World Bank Group, accessed April 9, 2018.
Daniel Victor, “Suspected Chemical Attack in Syria: What We Know and Don’t Know,” New York Times, April 11, 2018.
Ellen Francis, “The War on Syria’s Doctors,” Foreign Policy, August 11, 2016.
FAO and WFP, "Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment to the Syrian Arab Republic," Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and World Food Programme, July 18, 2017.
"Human Development Index," Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme, last accessed May 25, 2018.
 “Human Development Index (HDI) – 2010 Rankings,” European Choral Association, accessed April 12, 2018.
 “Human Development Reports: Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed April 9, 2018.
Jaafar Woertz and Eckart Woertz, “Agriculture as a Funding Source of ISIS: A GIS and Remote Sensing Analysis,” Food Policy 64 (2016): 14-25.
Kerina Tull, "Agriculture in Syria," University of Leeds Nuffield Centre for International Health and Development, June 26, 2017.
Marcus DeBois King “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 153-169.
Medecins Sans Frontieres, “Syria: Four Hospitals Hit as Bombing and Shellig Continue in Damascus Region,” October 7, 2016.
Mona Yacoubian, "Governance Challenges in Raqqa after the Islamic State," United States Institute of Peace, October 2017.
Omer Karasapan, "The War on Syria's Health System," Brookings Institute, February 23, 2016.
Rukmini Callimachi, “The ISIS Files,” New York Times, April 4, 2018.
"Selected Definitions of Peacebuilding," Peacebuilding News, Alliance for Peacebuilding, August 12, 2013.
“Syrian Arab Republic and FAO: Building Resilience and Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security”,” January 2018.
"Syria's Medical Community Under Assault," Physicians for Human Rights, October 2014.
 “Syria Population 2018,” World Population Review, 2017.
“The World Factbook: Syria,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified April 9, 2018.
Tobias von Lossow, "Water as Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris: the systematic instrumentalisation of water entails conflicting IS objectives," German Institute for International and security affairs, January 2016.
United Nations Children’s Fund, “Running Dry: Water and Sanitation Crisis Threatens Syrian Children,” Relief Web, February 8, 2013.
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) “Syrian Arab Republic: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey,” February 2008.
Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, "The Greatest Threat to People Returning to War-ravaged Raqqa: ISIS Mines," The Defense Post, October 20, 2017.

This post was written by IPD Research Affiliate Sebastian DeBeurs. Sebastian is a third year student in Plan II Honors and Government. His interests lie in developmental policy, political psychology, and poverty alleviation - especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. This past summer, Sebastian was a foreign service intern at the US Department of State in the Bureau for African Affairs.

Through the Bill Archer Fellowship, I have had the opportunity to work in Washington D.C. as an intern at the Aspen Network for Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE).
 
ANDE is a solid network of development organizations, corporates, banks, universities, and other organizations that support entrepreneurship and small and growing businesses (SGBs) in developing nations. SGBs are formal firms that employ between 5 and 250 employees with a strong potential for growth (ANDE, 2010). SGBs play a critical role in entrepreneurship-driven international development, generating sustainable employment as small businesses and local economies grow. The wealth generated by small and growing businesses often stays within the community, spurring the growth of other businesses and cultivating a self-sustaining private sector over the long run.

Entrepreneurship in developing nations is especially important to closing the gender gap. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 26% of women aged 18 to 64 in are entrepreneurially engaged (GEM, 2017). And of these female entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 36% cite “necessity” as a motive to start a small business or engage entrepreneurially (GEM, 2017). There are a range of reasons that necessitate entrepreneurship, including the exclusion of women from male-dominant professions or the necessity to generate additional income to sustain personal livelihood and that of families.
 
While critical to local economic development and female empowerment, SGBs face several challenges in the developing world. To fulfill their growth potential, SGBs often seek between $20,000 and $2 million in investment capital (ANDE, 2010). Yet these enterprises are often too small to access the capital, knowledge, and networks they need to scale, and too large to receive microfinance and seed funding, if there is any available in the first place. This creates a “missing middle” of investment capital in which SGBs in developing nations cannot access the adequate resources required for growth.
 
This is why the Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) is bringing together diverse actors from across the world to empower SGBs. By supporting entrepreneurs and small businesses in developing nations, organizations in the ANDE network put the agency for economic development in the hands of entrepreneurs and small business owners. Rather than outside actors dictating what works, this way of conducting international development trusts entrepreneurs to build businesses and generate their own economic solutions to their local economies.

Sources: 

Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs (ANDE) 2010 Impact Report. The Aspen Institute. 2011
Donna J. Kelley et al. Women’s Entrepreneurship Report 2016-2017. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). 2017

As we wrap up one more year with IPD, let's learn more about our dedicated students. Jenny has been with us since 2015!
​
1. What is your year and major at UT?
I am an incoming senior at UT majoring in Plan II, International Relations and Global Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies, minoring in Arabic.

2. How long have you been in IPD and how did you hear about the organization? Are you part of a specific team within IPD?
I joined IPD in the fall of 2015 on the Conflict and Development team, and have recently been working with the Open Aid Team. I heard about IPD from Vishal Duvvuru, a fellow classmate of mine from a class we had together about NGOs and Terrorism. He could tell I was really interested in aid projects in conflict stricken zones, and suggested I join IPD. My experience in the organization has really helped me explore these interests Vishal saw I had, and I am so thankful he introduced me to IPD.

3. What is the most rewarding part of contributing and being an active member of IPD? Have you faced any challenges while working in IPD?
The most rewarding part of being actively involved in IPD are the people I've been able to work with, and the skills I've learned from data workshops. There aren't a lot of opportunities for undergraduate students to work and collaborate with students and faculty from LBJ, but I have had incredible mentors over the past three years that have taught me so much, namely Raheem Chaudhry and Caleb Rudow. It's also amazing to be able to learn skills in OpenRefine, R, STATA, Excel, GIS, etc. without taking a semester long class; it's helped me with so many projects in IPD and even in my classes. The only challenge I would say I've faced in IPD is being an undergrad surrounded by so many successful and intelligent graduate students. They have more experience with field work, jobs, and are more narrowly studying the things we discuss in IPD - it can be a little intimidating at times. This challenge has definitely helped me grow as a student and researcher interested in aid, governance, and security.

4. How does your work with IPD relate to your career goals?
My future career goals are pretty wide, but IPD definitely relates to all these interests I hope to pursue. I either hope to work with a development aid agency, the state department in international security affairs, or with an IGO related to foreign aid projects and security. I have a strong passion about effective, long term, and sustainable aid in conflict stricken zones, and IPD is preparing me to make an impact in this field by analyzing what makes foreign aid effective. This summer I'll be living in Amman, Jordan, and will be working with the non-profit Souriyat Across Borders. I'll be volunteering with Syrian Refugees and will help them develop a summer curriculum for their aid projects in Amman. I'll be using skills that I learned from IPD lectures and workshops to build this curriculum, and can't wait to see what more I learn to bring back to IPD in the fall. 

This post was written by IPD Research Affiliate Tiffany Wang.

The agriculture sector is often the largest contributor to GDP and largest source of employment for many developing countries. In addition, many of the world’s poorest live in rural areas and often depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Sufficient agricultural investment is therefore critical for both encouraging economic development and reducing poverty rates for many of the neediest (Mogues 2008).
 
A study by Fan and Saurkar in 2008 identified public sector spending on agriculture as one of the most important policy instruments for promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty in rural areas for developing countries.  However, an increasingly popular way to supplement this public domestic spending is to attract private foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the OECD Factbook, FDI is defined as “cross-border investment by a resident entity in one economy with the objective of obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy.” Developing countries value agricultural FDI because it can increase productivity, encourage the transfer of technology, and open new capital markets (OECD Statistics, 2013).
 
But do higher levels of domestic agricultural investment and higher levels of foreign investment really improve the wellbeing of the rural poor?  I explored this question using data from the Ending Rural Hunger (ERH) project developed by the Brookings Institution. My principal hypothesis was that public domestic investment in agriculture is more effective at reducing rural poverty rates than private foreign spending in agriculture.
 
In my first model, I tried to find the relative effects of public and private spending on agriculture on rural poverty, controlling for the amount of access to land for the rural poor and the investment climate for rural businesses. I was specifically interested in seeing the relative effectiveness of the two types of spending when considering how strong of a position the rural community had for doing business (as approximated by the rural community’s access to land and the strength of their business climate).

Since I used a log-log model, I found that for every 1% increase in government spending, there was a 0.475% drop in the rural multidimensional poverty headcount. This result was significant, and made sense because an increased amount of government spending should lead to less rural poverty. The surprising result was for my estimate for the effect of foreign direct investment in agriculture on rural poverty. I found that for a 1% increase in foreign direct investment, there was a 0.014% increase in rural poverty. Although this estimator was not significant, it raised interesting questions. Why would an increase in foreign direct investment in agriculture hurt rural communities? This would support the “Land Grabbing Theory” described in the literature where increased levels of FDI to agriculture can potentially be harmful to developing countries because the type of FDI to agriculture these days are resource seeking rather than long-term investment.
 
For my second model, I decided to interact the terms of foreign direct investment to agriculture and access to land. This is because I believed the efficacy of FDI to agriculture could change significantly depending on the strength of measures for amount of access to land a rural community has. This is in line with a lot of the literature related to the Land Grabbing Theory because social scientists believe that if communities have stronger access to land, then they can bargain better with foreign investors and this would lead to better development outcomes.

​The new results are very compelling. I found that for every 1% increase in government spending, there was a 0.478% drop in the rural multidimensional poverty headcount. This result was significant, and very similar to the estimator we found from the first model. The FDI to agriculture variable interacted with access to land changed signs from positive in Model 1 to negative in Model 2. The interaction also became significant, which suggests that access to land can really influence how effective FDI to agriculture is for the rural poor. I found that for a 1% increase in FDI interacted with Access to Land, there was a 0.332% decrease in rural poverty. This estimator was significant and showed that while increased levels of FDI to agriculture can be harmful to the rural poor, there is more to the story.  We have to consider the amount of access to land. We can best see how the coefficient of FDI to agriculture changes as you measure the access to land with this graphic:
 

The graphic above shows that the estimated coefficient for FDI is positive until around 3.5 on the 1-6 scale of the “Access to Land” measure created by the IFAD Rural Performance Assessments. The interpretation is that when the access to land is between 1 to 3.5, increased FDI to agriculture actually increases rural poverty, hence the positive slope coefficient. When access to land is 3.5 and above, increased FDI to agriculture decreases rural poverty. The policy implications of these results is that governments need to take steps to improve the rural poor’s access to land in order to prevent negative effects from incoming FDI. This means improving mechanisms for access to land for rural households, women, indigenous groups, and enforcing land rights so that the majority of land holdings are titled or registered.  

In summary, I found that FDI to agriculture could be harmful to the rural poor in developing countries unless there is some measure of access to land for rural communities. Possible next steps for research include adding public domestic investment and foreign aid into the analysis as other independent variables. I would also be interested in going into the data and finding out where exactly the money from foreign direct investment and public domestic investment is being spent.   

References:
Fan, Shenggen, and Saurkar, Anuja. “Tracking Agricultural Spending for Agricultural Growth and Poverty Reduction in Africa.” RESAKSS Issue Brief No. 5. 2008. 

Mogues, Tewodaj, Bingxin Yu, Shenggen Fan, and Linden McBride. “The Impacts of Public Investment In and For Agriculture.” Agricultural Development Economics Division, Oct. 2012. Web.

"Statistics / OECD Factbook / 2013 /." OECD Library: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Dec. 2016.

​Riding a ferry, that was essentially a plank of wood, across the Nile, I was filled with anticipation for our trip to Northern Uganda. The Women of Uganda Network, the organization I work with, has partners, constituents, and influence throughout Uganda. This trip to Apac in Northern Uganda was intended to build our network by supporting the groups that we helped establish, as well as train and create a new network of women entrepreneurs.

The Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET) has developed about 465 teams throughout Uganda that monitor the delivery of government services in their districts. These teams are 70% women and are known as VSACs, Voluntary Social Accountability Committees. Becoming members of these accountability committees put volunteers’ jobs and livelihoods at risk, especially when they first began. Yet, these brave souls endured for the betterment of their communities and their hard work has been a great success.

WOUGNET helps these groups organize and provides continued training in using ICTs (Information, Communication, and Technology) to hold the government accountable for its commitments and responsibilities in their communities. VSACs attend budget and planning meetings with local government officials at the sub-county and district level to remain aware of how money is allocated in their district. Members of the VSAC committees monitor the progress of infrastructure and other projects and report that progress to WOUGNET, as well as following up with the officials and project managers in charge of delivering those services. When services are not delivered properly or at all, VSAC members find out who is responsible for the hold up, whether it be a contractor or a government official, and demand they complete the project, else be “named and shamed” on the radio, in the newspaper, online, and in engagement meetings. Naming and shaming has proven to be a successful means of increasing accountability and service delivery in Apac, as the community is small enough that people know each other by name. Since the inception of VSACs in Apac, the community has seen major improvements in the delivery of services, including road construction, increased teacher attendance, and access to safe drinking water.

 We sat in a large circle outside under a massive tree. It was a gorgeous day to sit on such a lush piece of land. Members of this VSAC committee, who are primarily farmers, took half the day off to discuss current projects and challenges with us. The WOUGNET team discussed our plan for the way forward: increasing the use of technology to speed up communication, and thus reporting service delivery failures, and ultimately, improving service delivery. VSAC members pointed out a major road block, which is the unreliability of power in Apac. When there is no power, they cannot charge the smartphone that WOUGNET donated to them for reporting. No power = no charge = no reporting. To solve this, the WOUGNET team is working on a proposal for funding for a solar charger. Still many more challenges arose and members from WOUGNET and the VSAC discussed solutions. People agreed and disagreed and made a lot of jokes. It was a dialogue and everyone’s opinion was heard, respected and considered. After, they warmly embraced us and one woman said to call her “mama”. They discussed their individual hardships and successes, as women and as farmers. The dedication these people had to their community could not be overstated. They are empowered, resilient, organized and improving the state of Apac.

Day two on our trip to the north, we met with a group of 35 women entrepreneurs in Red Cross Hall, a large teal and red room in a village just outside Apac. They all had started their own businesses, on their own. There were tailors and bakers, retail sellers and barbers, restaurant owners and many more. My boss, Goretti got the women fired up about the opportunities afforded to groups, rather than individuals: funding grants, trainings applications, conference invitations, and perhaps most importantly, a voice that will be heard. That day the women voted in a Chair Person, a Vice Chair, a Secretary and a Treasurer. They discussed the major challenges of being female entrepreneurs in Apac and, together, we came up with solutions. Capital was the first obstacle listed. Banks have high interest rates and often won’t loan to these women. Hence, the women decided to start a bank amongst themselves. Each member of their new association would put 1,000 Ugandan Shillings (UGX) a week and after one year, members could take out loans at a very low interest rate. 1,000 UGX is about 30 cents in USD and is an affordable, yet significant amount in Apac. The money would be managed by their treasurer, an older woman who most refer to as their mother and is highly respected in the village. By the end of one year they will have collectively saved 1,820,000 UGX. We discussed marketing techniques, customer care, and the language barrier among other things. The space was collaborative and I contributed a suggestion: create signage that is both visually appealing and written in at least three languages, as that would ameliorate the language barrier, as well as improving the issues with marketing. My recommendation was heartily accepted.

At the completion of the meeting, the women clapped at us, the WOUGNET team, as a form of appreciation for our attendance and support. It was as if they were tossing the sound and motion of the clap in our direction. Then they embraced us, shook our hands and we exchanged genuine and sincere smiles filled with deep respect and gratitude.
​
These women raise each other up and in that meeting they lifted us too. They are empowered and its contagious. I felt profoundly grateful to have been involved in their formation and hope that I am able to fully embody their spirit in my work, both with WOUGNET and as I start my career.  

1. What is your year and major at UT?
I am a sophomore and Economics and Mathematics double major.

2. How long have you been in IPD and how did you hear about the organization? Are you part of a specific team within IPD?
I joined IPD my freshman year, and have been here for the past 3 semesters. Being extremely interested in getting a research opportunity, I was actively looking for avenues for getting involved. That is when I heard about IPD from one of my professors. I am in the Governance and Development team, as well as the Complex Emergencies and Political Stability in Asia (CEPSA) team.

3. What is the most rewarding part of contributing and being an active member of IPD? Have you faced any challenges while working in IPD?
Being able to work closely with such motivated students and professors is definitely the most rewarding part of IPD. That has expanded my knowledge about the developmental work being done around the world. The most challenging part at first was finding the right balance between IPD and studies. But the benefits and the amount I learn at IPD provide something that a classroom education can never provide, which makes it worth the effort. 

4. How does your work with IPD relate to your career goals?
I wish to go to graduate school and eventually work in the developmental economics field. Thus it is essential that I make good use of my time at UT and gain as much knowledge and experience as I can about the field. Fortunately, IPD has given me the perfect opportunity to do so.
Working with the Governance team, collecting and analyzing data to find the existence of clientelism in Honduras, has expanded my knowledge about developmental politics. Meanwhile the CEPSA team gives me an important insight into the realm of global aid tracking and analysis, and also the limitations that come with it.

5. What are your hopes for the rest of this school year?
The hope is definitely to come up with a publication-worthy article for the Governance team, now that we have gone through the hard part of finding and cleaning up the data!

Dedicated, ambitious students are what IPD possible! Meet Haley who has been with IPD for almost two years.
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1. What is your year and major at UT?
4th year International Relations and Global Studies Major (IRG)

2. How long have you been in IPD and how did you hear about the organization? Are you part of a specific team within IPD?
I've been in IPD since the fall of my sophomore year, I heard about the organization from a friend who was in it and suggested that I might be interested in the work IPD was doing. This semester, I'm a part of the Data4Peace team. In the past I was on the Natural Resource and Conflict team. 

3. What is the most rewarding part of contributing and being an active member of IPD? Have you faced any challenges while working in IPD?
I joined IPD out of an interest in developing skills that weren't necessarily offered to me through my liberal arts courses for my IRG degree. I was really interested in learning GIS, and when I expressed this interest to team leads, they made sure to incorporate me into GIS-related projects to help me learn the ropes. I think being able to see yourself actually grow in a skill set is really rewarding, and not something you always get when taking a more conceptual and analytical course load where progress is harder to measure. In addition to the reward of that measurable personal growth, IPD has really exposed me to important global issues and opportunities to contribute to meaningful solutions to issues I find interesting. 

4. How does your work with IPD relate to your career goals?
One of my favorite parts of IPD is that it coordinates undergrads and grad students into the same space and the same conversations about issues we're all interested in. Those conversations and connections have really helped me envision the ways in which the skills I'm learning in IPD will likely come in handy when I'm applying to grad school in a few years. 

5. What are your hopes for the rest of this school year? 
GRADUATE—I'm trying to really soak in as much of UT and Austin as I can before I graduate! 

When faced with complex global issues, our nation is naturally inclined to use its military. The U.S. military is the most advanced, well-prepared, and expansive force in world history. Yet the complex security issues the world faces call for innovations in diplomacy and development – not merely military force. Violent extremism and terrorism hailing from developing nations can be more effectively prevented if the U.S. increases investments in international development funding and programs beyond its military. In building a comprehensive national security strategy, the U.S. must raise the importance of international development to that of defense as an instrument of foreign policy.

Poverty and Conflict

The causes of violent security issues are often intricately linked to a country’s economic and political state of development. Complex issues such as terrorism, insurgency, and civil war are not security issues only: they are development issues (State Department 2015). This is especially true for the least developed countries in the world, the highest concentration of which is in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, terrorist organizations such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the Tuareg jihadists in Mali often hail from areas struck by droughts, failed harvests, lack of water, food, sanitation, unemployment, and more at a lower overall stage of economic and political development. Researchers of the so-called “poverty-conflict nexus” have found that poverty lowers the opportunity cost for actors to join a civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Areas with relatively higher per-capita income, for example, have more to lose from the loss of labor and economic disruptions of civil war than areas with lower per-capita income, where actors experience greater incentives to join a rebel force (Buhaug 2011). The lower opportunity cost of rebellion raises the probability of a civil conflict breaking out in impoverished regions. The U.S. should include these research findings in its foreign policy and take a comprehensive view economic underdevelopment as a leading cause of conflict.

The 3D Strategy: Development, Diplomacy, Defense
 
Since the causes of violent conflict are intricately linked to development, we can no longer separate our international security policies from our international development policies. This involves a deepening of cooperation between the Defense Department, State Department, and USAID in order to pursue what is called the “3D” strategy of diplomacy, defense, and development (USAID 2013). By pooling their unique strengths and resources, the Departments can implement a development-minded security policy. In addition to its current drone programs, airstrikes, and military measures, the U.S. should significantly expand investment in development programs and aid aimed at uplifting countries’ standard of living, economy, and democratic system in a way that would help raise communities out of poverty and the violent extremism it produces.
 
A Tillerson Plan of International Development
 
U.S. international development policy should focus its funds and capacity on priority development goals. These include improving sustainable agriculture, sanitation, disease-prevention, education and training, female empowerment, and democratic governance, among others. Arguably one of the greatest achievements in U.S. foreign policy history, the Marshall Plan of 1948, helped build economic and political capacity in Europe after World War II while opening lucrative economic markets for trade with the U.S. (De Long 1991; Miller 2014). Just like Secretary of State George Marshall paved the way for the Marshall Plan, so can the United States under Secretary Rex Tillerson cultivate a game-changing “Tillerson Plan” of international development policy that will simultaneously benefit the security and economy of developing nations and that of the U.S.
 
It would be arrogant and naïve to assume that the U.S. could solve a country’s faulting economic system, or raise the standard of living of nations like Somalia to Western standards overnight. While the 3D strategy sets high goals, it does not argue that the U.S. could or should completely transform nations on its own. Rather, it holds that raising development to the importance of diplomacy and defense in foreign policy would be effective alongside traditional military tools in addressing security issues. Beyond humanitarian objectives, any increase in U.S. contribution towards international development is a contribution towards greater international security.
 
Security through Development
 
The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) published by the State Department in 2010 and 2015 outlines a U.S. strategy that intricately links diplomacy to development, presenting ambitious programs to reduce global poverty and forge global development partnerships  (State Department 2015). Yet this promising foreign policy continues to lack proper funding. The budget for the Department of Defense for 2016 was about $850 billion, while that of the Department of State and USAID combined was only about $50 billion (U.S. Budget FY 2016). To adequately counter violent conflict, terrorism, health epidemics, and poverty around the world, the Department of State and USAID must receive adequate political, financial, and ideological support.

Sebastian De Beurs is a Plan II Honors, Government, and History major focusing on U.S. foreign policy and international political economy. His research interests lie in sub-Saharan African peace and development, about which he blogs on www.africaffairs.org. Sebastian is a also an Undergraduate Fellow in the Clements Center and a Virtual Student Foreign Service intern with the U.S. Department of State. 

Works Cited

• Buhaug, Halvard., Gleditsch, Kristian., Holtermann, Helge., Otsby, Gudrun., Tollefson, Andreas, 2011. “It's the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth Dispersion and Conflict Outbreak Location” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 55, No. 5 pp. 814-840
• Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4): 563-95
• De Long, J. Bradford, and Barry Eichengreen. The Marshall Plan: History's most successful structural adjustment program. No. w3899. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.
• Miller, Paul. “The Case for Aid.” Foreign Policy. 21 January 2014. Web.
• Office of Management and Budget. “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2016.” U.S. Government Publishing Office. 2 February 2015
• U.S. Agency for International Development. “3D Planning Guide: Diplomacy, Development, Defense.” 31 July 2012.
• U.S. Department of State. “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.” 29 April 2015.