

## SUSANNA P. CAMPBELL, PHD

*Post-Doctoral Researcher*  
Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP)  
The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID)  
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### ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

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POST-DOCTORAL RESEARCHER, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) <i>The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies</i>	Sept. '12 – Present Geneva
VISITING LECTURER, Department of Political Science and International Relations <i>University of Geneva</i>	Feb. – Jun. '13 Geneva
VISITING POST-DOCTORAL SCHOLAR, Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies (SIWPS) <i>Columbia University</i>	Jan. '12 – Aug. '12 New York, NY
ANALYST <i>International Crisis Group</i>	July – Dec. '02 Nairobi, Kenya
PROJECT OFFICER (REPORTING) AND HEAD OF COMMUNICATIONS <i>UNICEF Burundi Country Office</i>	Feb. '01 – June '02 Bujumbura, Burundi
HUMANITARIAN CONSOLIDATED INTERAGENCY APPEAL (CAP) COORDINATOR <i>UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO)</i>	Sept. '00 – Jan. '01 Nairobi, Kenya
GREAT LAKES COORDINATION OFFICER <i>Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER)</i>	Sept. '99 – July '00 Nairobi, Kenya
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, Center for Preventive Action <i>Council on Foreign Relations</i>	Sept. '96 – Sept. '99 New York, NY

### EDUCATION

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PHD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS <i>The Fletcher School, Tufts University</i>	May '12 Medford, MA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ <i>Dissertation:</i> Organizational Barriers to Peace: Agency and Structure in International Peacebuilding</li><li>▪ <i>Committee:</i> Peter Uvin (Chair), Tufts University; Antonia Handler Chayes, Tufts University; Karen Jacobsen, Tufts University</li><li>▪ <i>Brief Dissertation Abstract:</i> Using evidence from the hard case of international peacebuilding, I show that IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors vary significantly in their ability to achieve their local peacebuilding aims; heterogeneity that existing peacebuilding and global governance scholarship fail to explain. I argue that IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors achieve positive peacebuilding performance only when they have formal accountability routines that prioritize peacebuilding and informal field-based accountability routines. Consequently, the legitimacy of IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors in international peacebuilding is partly dependent on the agency of individual staff who are willing to circumvent accountability systems put in place by the organizations' principals. In other words, bad behavior is necessary for good performance.</li></ul>	

MASTER OF ARTS IN LAW AND DIPLOMACY

*The Fletcher School, Tufts University*

May '05  
Medford, MA

BACHELOR OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Tufts University*

May '96  
Medford, MA

#### ADDITIONAL TRAINING

- AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION SHORT COURSES  
Multi-method Research; Field Research '09, '12, '15
- SUMMER SCHOOL IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS (SSERM)  
Regression II with Timothy McDaniel - *University of St. Gallen* Jun. '15  
St. Gallen
- INTERNATIONAL SUMMER POLICY INSTITUTE (IPSI)  
*School of International Service, American University* Jun. '13  
Washington, DC
- INSTITUTE FOR QUALITATIVE AND MULTI-METHOD RESEARCH (IQMR)  
*Consortium for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, University of Arizona* Jan. '08  
Tempe, AZ

#### PUBLICATIONS

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##### **Peer-Reviewed Books**

***A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*** (ed. with David Chandler and Meera Sabaratnam). London: Zed Books, 2011.

##### **Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles**

**(Dis)integration, Incoherence and Complexity in UN Post-conflict Interventions.** *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4:556-569, 2008.

**The UN's Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers** (with Anja Kaspersen). *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4:470-485, 2008.

**When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success.** *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 4, no. 2:20-32, 2008.

##### **Peer-Reviewed Book Chapters**

**The Burundi Leadership Training Program** (with Peter Uvin). In Michael Lund ed. *Unofficial Contact: Convening Leaders in Conflict to Build Peace*. New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming.

**Routine Learning? How Peacebuilding Organizations Prevent Liberal Peace.** In Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds. *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books, 2011.

**The Politics of Liberal Peace** (with David Chandler and Meera Sabaratnam). In Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds. *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding*. London: Zed Books, 2011.

##### **Other Book Chapters**

**Peacebuilding in Burundi and the Impact of the UN Peacebuilding Fund Portfolio, 2007–2013** (with Josiah Marineau, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, and Daniel Walker). In Cedric de Coning and Eli Stamnes eds. *The 2015 Review of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture: Impact of the first 10 years?* London: Palgrave, forthcoming.

**Regional Humanitarian Organizations** (with Stephanie Hofmann). In Roger Mac Ginty and Jenny Peterson eds. *Handbook on Humanitarian Action*. London: Routledge, 2015.

**Statebuilding** (with Jenny Peterson). In Roger Mac Ginty ed. *Handbook of Peacebuilding*, London: Routledge, 2013.

**Experiences in Prevention** (with Barnett Rubin). In *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund/ Council on Foreign Relations, p. 1-21, 1998.

### ***Manuscripts Under Review***

#### ***Global Governance and Local Peace***

*Under Review* with Cambridge University Press

*Abstract:* *Global Governance and Local Peace* explains why International Organizations (IOs), International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs), and bilateral aid agencies sometimes achieve their country-level peacebuilding aims, and sometimes do not. Existing research claims that the country-level behavior of international actors is constrained by bureaucratic dysfunction and the preferences of their headquarters. In reality, the hundreds of IO, INGO, and donor offices established in conflict-affected countries have a high degree of independent decision-making power. *Global Governance and Local Peace* argues that international peacebuilding performance occurs only when independent country-level IO, INGO, or bilateral donor staff empower local populations to hold the international organization accountable. Without this local-level accountability, intervening organizations are likely to fail at peacebuilding. Their focus solely on global accountability undermines their chances at local-level performance. Through in-depth case studies into the behavior of five intervening organizations over a fourteen-year period in Burundi, this book provides an unprecedented examination of the country-level successes and failures of international interveners. Contrary to the existing peacebuilding literature, which focuses on failure, *Global Governance and Local Peace* shows that intervening organizations can achieve their country-level peacebuilding aims, but only when individual staff sidestep bureaucratic and hierarchical incentives and empower local populations.

#### **Improving Their Standing: How Regional Hegemons Make use of Institutional Design**

(with Stephanie Hofmann and Barbara Bravo de Moraes Mendes)

*Revise and Resubmit* with *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*

*Abstract:* How do rising powers choose to allocate their finite resources among the multiple potential global and regional security organizations? Building on the literatures on regime complexity, rising powers and comparative regionalism, we argue that the different organizational investment choices of rising powers are explained by regional ideological constellations. Rising powers assess regional and global organizations according to how they accommodate their emergent ambitions. Organizational settings have ideational foundations that can look very different from region to region. We argue that regional ideological coherence leads rising powers to invest in regional rather than global organizations. However, if the ideological composition of the region is highly diverse, global organizations are a better vehicle to accommodate these states, their power and preferences. To demonstrate our argument, we examine the choices of Brazil and South Africa in terms of their material and ideational investments in regional and global organizations.

### ***Completed Manuscripts in Preparation for Submission***

**International NGOs and State Capacity: Facilitator or Destroyer?** (with Matthew DiGiuseppe and Amanda Murdie)

*Abstract:* Do international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) facilitate or destroy the bureaucratic capacity of the states in which they operate? The literature is split on this question. Some scholars argue that INGOs weaken state capacity by delivering social services that the government is supposed to provide. Others argue that by increasing a country's domestic demand for improved human rights, INGOs improve a government's capacity to fulfill them. In this paper, we show that the effect of INGOs on state capacity depends upon whether a state is democratic or non-

democratic. In our cross-sectional time-series analysis, we find that INGO presence has a significant positive relationship with state capacity in democracies, but no relationship with state capacity in non-democratic states. These findings help to explain the inconsistent claims in the exiting INGO literature and are also relevant for INGOs and the policymakers that support them.

### **Not Built for Peace: Why Informal Accountability Determines International Peacebuilding Success**

*Abstract:* Of central concern to the study of international organizations is their ability to achieve the normative aims of their principals. Existing scholarship on International Organizations (IOs), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and state aid agencies has explained their success and failure in terms of institutional design, bureaucratic pathologies, and headquarter-level interactions between IOs, INGOs, and states. Scholars have largely ignored the behavior and performance of these global governors' country-level offices, assuming that they simply implement the tasks delegated to them. Using evidence from the hard case of international peacebuilding, I show that IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors vary significantly in their ability to achieve their local peacebuilding aims; heterogeneity that existing peacebuilding and global governance scholarship fail to explain. I argue that IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors achieve positive peacebuilding performance only when they have formal accountability routines that prioritize peacebuilding and informal field-based accountability routines. Individual country-level staff create these informal accountability routines by circumventing formal routines, delegating informal power to local actors who are underrepresented by institutions of global governance. The implication is that the legitimacy of IOs, INGOs, and bilateral donors in the international security policy arena is partly dependent on the agency of individual staff who are willing to bypass the systems their principals established to hold them accountable. In other words, bad behavior is necessary for good performance.

### **Research and Manuscripts in Progress**

#### **Aiding Peace: Donor Behavior in Conflict-Affected Countries** (with Michael Findley)

*Abstract:* Despite prominent claims by international development organizations that they run highly conflict-sensitive operations, little is known about how the international community acts and reacts to the dynamics of civil war peace processes. This study hypothesizes that during peace processes foreign aid donors are motivated by four primary factors: their own strategic interest, their organizational flexibility, positive cooperative events, and negative conflictual events. Using subnationally-geocoded foreign aid information, and relying on extensive interviews in Kinshasa and Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, we examine the extent to which these four factors encourage or discourage substantial changes in foreign aid donors' development assistance. The results show that while both conflictual and cooperative events influence changes in the foreign aid of all donors, their direction of shift is counterintuitive. Donors give more aid in response to conflict than cooperation. This may reward national actors who participate in violent conflict more than those who cooperate in the absence of violent conflict. Within the population of donors, those with strategic interest in the DRC make larger shifts – negative and positive – in subnational foreign aid allocation over time. Donors with strategic interest are generally more sensitive to the dynamics of civil war peace processes than those without strategic interest. Organizational flexibility, as coded in this study, does not appear to affect aid allocation in most cases. This analysis is a first step towards a comprehensive coding and analysis of foreign aid dynamics during peace processes, which will be based on data from the DRC, Sudan, and Nepal as well as survey experiments with donors in other countries.

#### **Contracting Sovereignty: How weak states reclaim their authority to govern**

*Abstract:* Dozens of International Organizations (IOs), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and States intervene in each fragile and conflict-affected country to save lives and build the foundations for sustainable peace and development. International relations literature assumes that once these global governors exercise, possess, or assert their authority to intervene in a country's

domestic territory, they do not have to renegotiate this authority (Lake 2010). This paper argues that a conflict-affect state renegotiates the authority of IOs, INGOs, and intervening states regularly through formal contracts and procedures. IOs, INGOs, and intervening states require the agreement and cooperation of the 'host' government to import procured goods, hire staff, establish their offices, and implement new strategies and programs. Through these daily interactions, the 'host' government reclaims some of its sovereign authority from these intervening organizations. The maintenance of contracts therefore enables supposedly weak states to wield significant power over the actors in global governance that operate on their territory. Contrary to claims in the international relations literature that international interveners impose their agenda on weak states, this paper uses detailed ethnographic fieldwork and archival research to show that conflict-affected states are increasingly using contractual arrangements to exercise significant power over international actors intervening on their territory.

### **Constructing Success in United Nations Peacebuilding (with Ole Jacob Sending)**

*Abstract:* How is success constructed in the United Nations (UN) peacebuilding? Given that the UN does not systematically evaluate the impact of its work, what is success? The International Organization (IO) literature largely assumes that the tasks delegated to the IO by its principals are carried out by the IO. Organizational performance in line with these tasks is then reported back to the IO's principals, enabling the principals to hold the IO accountable for achieving these tasks delegated to it. In reality, measures of performance and success in the UN may not correspond to the preferences of the principals, particularly in the case where there are multiple principals with competing preferences and where performance is particular difficult to measure, such as in international peacebuilding. This paper aims to investigate both implicit and explicit measures of performance and success in the UN using survey experiments and semi-structured interviews. The findings will have implications for theories of delegation and performance in IOs, as well as policies intended to improve the performance of the UN.

### **Slacking or Succeeding: UN Peacebuilding Performance in Burundi**

*Abstract:* Investigations of UN peacebuilding have assessed the success or failure of the UN in terms of the number of battle deaths that occur, or reoccur, in a post-war country. While these scholars provide important insights into the conditions that end civil war, they tell us little about the actual behavior of the UN during or after civil wars. This paper argues that the peacebuilding performance of the UN in war-torn countries is determined by a combination of the opportunities in the context, the preferences of its principals, the overall culture of the organization, and the agency of individual country-level staff. It does this through case studies of the behavior of the UN Development Program and four different UN peace operations (UNOB, ONUB, BINUB, and BNUB) in Burundi between 1999 and 2015. Through detailed empirical research, this paper demonstrates that neither rationalist nor constructivist theories of IOs fully explain their country-level behavior, particularly during war-to-peace transitions. Neither rationalism nor constructivism explains the UN staff behavior that is inconsistent with UN principals' preferences or its organizational culture. This paper argues that this exceptional staff behavior is a key determinant of UN Peacebuilding Performance.

### **The Micro-Dynamics of Peacebuilding: A Quasi-Experimental Spatial Impact Evaluation in Burundi (with Michael Findley and Daniel Walker)**

*Abstract:* When does international peacebuilding assistance have the desired sub-national effect in post-conflict countries? The literature on UN peace operations argues that the presence of robust and well-resourced UN peacekeeping operations helps to prevent some post-conflict countries from falling back into war, although countries that have experienced civil war still have a 57 percent rate of recidivism. The literature on international aid argues that more aid combined with a particular mixture of policy reforms will help to stabilize post-conflict contexts, but does not tell us how this mixture comes about. Based on the findings from our 2013 quasi-experimental impact evaluation of US\$ 44 million that the UN Peacebuilding Fund allocated to Burundi between 2007 and 2013, we

argue that the sub-national effect of international aid to post-conflict countries is due, in part, to how activities are implemented. Our quasi-experimental spatial study, combining a large household level survey with almost 200 semi-structured interviews, shows that the same organization with the same type of project can be successful in one location, but fail in another, in part because of how individual staff carry out its implementation. We thus identify the conditions under which peacebuilding assistance helps or hurts, which moves away from probabilistic accounts that ignore the important role played by project implementation and the individual staff who carry it out.

**The Ontology of Peace: Landscapes of Conflict and Cooperation** (with Michael Findley and Kyosuke Kikuta)

*Abstract:* International Relations scholarship has conceptualized post-war peace as a reduction in the number of battle deaths and the achievement of a minimal degree of peace agreement implementation. It has largely studied peace as a binary characteristic, identifying it as the absence of military battles rather than the presence of a multidimensional set of conflict-mitigating institutions and associated violent (or nonviolent) behaviors. This paper presents a complex systems model of the patterns of violent conflict and cooperation, showing how “fitness” landscapes capture escalating violence, deescalating violence, or increased cooperation all in tandem. It grounds this model in data on conflict and cooperation in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nepal, and Sudan between 1990 and 2015. In so doing, this paper presents a new, empirically grounded, ontology of peace.

### **Policy Briefs**

**Governing Globally, Acting Locally: Lessons from Burundi for International Peacebuilding Reform.** Stephen Browne and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. *Challenges for the UN Development System*. New York: Future of The UN Development System, July 2015.

**What Burundi’s crisis says about U.N. capacity to build peace.** The Monkey Cage Blog, *Washington Post*, 18 May 2015.

**Technology and Peacebuilding: Impact Evaluation and Learning** (with Michael Findley and Jennifer Welch). White Paper for *Build Peace: Peace Through Technology* Conference, MIT Media Lab, 2014.

**Institutional Capacity Building for Conflict Sensitivity.** *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack*. London: International Alert, 2004.

**A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi.** Brussels: International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 57, 2003.

### **Research Reports and Evaluations**

**Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi** (with Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker). New York: UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), 2014.

**UNDP’s Role in Peacebuilding: Issues and Strategy** (with Lisa Schirch). New York: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 2012.

**The Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi: Independent External Evaluation.** New York: Peacebuilding Support Office and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010.

**The Challenge of Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: Supporting Leadership Development – A Global Review of Eight Leadership Development Interventions funded by the LICUS Trust Fund and Post-Conflict Fund** (with Kelly Hannum). Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009.

**The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment** (with Peter Uvin). Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2004.

## RESEARCH GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS

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### Research Grants

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS) Grant, \$240,000 <i>Aiding Peace? Donor Behavior in Conflict-Affected Countries</i>	Jan. '14 – June '16
CO-PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) Grant, \$270,000 <i>Bad Behavior? Explaining Performance in International Peacebuilding</i>	Nov. '13 – Oct. '15
CO-PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, Center on Conflict and Development, Texas A&M, \$24,600 <i>Crowdsourcing Peace: Closing the Feedback Loop in War-to-Peace Transitions</i>	Aug. '14 – Nov '14
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, UN Peacebuilding Fund in Burundi, \$52,000 Quasi-experimental evaluation of \$44 million UN Program	Oct. '13 – Dec. '13
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, UN Peacebuilding Fund In Burundi, \$35,000 Evaluation of \$35 Million UN Program	Oct '09 – Dec. '09
CO-PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, World Bank, Post-Conflict Fund, \$100,000 Global Review of World Bank's Leadership Development Interventions	May '08 – Feb. '09
CO-PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR, World Bank, Post-Conflict Fund, \$40,000 Evaluation of \$1 Million NGO Leadership Program in Burundi	May '04 – Aug '04

### Fellowships

Swiss National Science Foundation Post-Doctoral Researcher Grant, for Columbia U.	Jan. '12 – Aug. '12
The Fletcher School, Tufts University, PhD Scholarship	Sept. '05 – Aug. '11
USIP Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellowship	Sept. '08 – Sept. '09
The Fletcher School, Tufts University, IQMR Scholarship	Jan. '08
Tufts University Provost Fellowship	Sept. '07 – Aug. '08

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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VISITING LECTURER, 'Relations Internationales II: Les Acteurs de la Gouvernance Mondiale' <i>Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva</i>	Feb. – Jun. '13 Geneva
GUEST LECTURER - Recurrent at the following institutions: <i>Stanford University</i> <i>University of California, Irvine</i> <i>The Fletcher School, Tufts University</i> <i>Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva</i>	Feb. '08 – Apr. '14
TEACHING ASSISTANT, Law and Politics of International Conflict Management, Prof. Chayes <i>The Fletcher School, Tufts University</i>	Spring '04 Medford, MA

## PRESENTATIONS

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### Academic Conferences

- American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting: 2009, 2014, 2015
- International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
- International Security Forum (ISF): 2009, 2013

- Swiss Political Science Association (SPSA): 2013

### ***Invited Academic Talks***

- Feb. '15 *Consultants and Contracting in IOs and INGOs*. Exploratory Workshop organized by Copenhagen Business School, February 26-27.
- Nov. '14 *Not Built for Peace: Why Informal Accountability Determines International Peacebuilding Success*, Case Study Integrity Workshop (CSIF) funded by the GREEN project from the European Commission's Seventh Framework Program, November 26, 2014, Geneva.
- Oct. '14 *Not Built for Peace: Why Informal Accountability Determines International Peacebuilding Success*, AGORA V Workshop, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, October 7-8, 2014, *Warwick*.
- May '14 *Building Sub-national Peace: Authority, Legitimacy, and Accountability in International Peacebuilding*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ISP Network Conference, *Institutional Reforms in Post-war and Divided Societies, Part of the Problem of Part of the Solution?*, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, *Geneva*.
- Apr. '14 *Designed to Fail at Peace: The Micro-Dynamics of Successful Intervention in Civil War*, ISA Venture Workshop, *Influencing International Relations: Power Politics, Informal Politics, or Both?*, *Toronto*.
- Apr. '14 *Adapting for Peace: Formal and Informal Accountability in International Institutions*, paper presented at *Adapting Institutions*, German Institute of International Affairs (GIGA) International Seminar, *Hamburg*.
- Mar. '14 *External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund in Burundi (2007-2013)*, MGPS International Colloquium Speaker Series, University of Texas at Austin, *Austin, Texas*.
- Mar. '13 *Improving Their Standing: How Regional Hegemons Make use of Institutional Design*, ECPR Joint Sessions Workshop, *Design and Effects of international Institutions*, *Mainz*.
- July '12 *Organizational Barriers to Peace: Agency and Structure in International Peacebuilding*, Bopst Center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University, *Princeton, NJ*.
- Apr. '12 *Organizational Barriers to Peace: Agency and Structure in International Peacebuilding*, Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, *New York, NY*.
- Mar. '12 *Instituting Failure: Why Deviance Explains Peacebuilding Success*, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, *Ottawa*.
- Oct. '09 *Organizational Barriers to Peace? Intervening between statebuilding institutions and institutions of the state*, The Future of Statebuilding: Ethics, Power and Responsibility in International Relations, University of Westminster, *London*.
- Sept. '09 *Organizational Barriers to Peace*, Institute of Political Science, St. Gallen, *St. Gallen*.
- Sept. '09 *Determining Peace in Burundi: Organizational Rules, Routines and Risk*, Center for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, *Ottawa*.
- July '09 *Organizational Barriers to Peace*, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Institute of Federal Technology, *Zurich*.
- May '08 *Organizational Barriers to Peace*, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), *Stanford, CA*.
- Aug. '05 *The Burundi Leadership Training Program*, Working Group on Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States, WWICS, *Washington, DC*.



Nov. '08 *Organizational Barriers to Peace: Role of Learning and Luck in Peacebuilding*, NCCR Trade Regulation Brown Bag Lunch, World Trade Institute (WTI), Bern.

### ***Invited Policy Lectures and Presentations***

- Mar. '15 Private Briefing for UN Peacebuilding High-level Panel, organized by the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) of the Social Science Research Council, Brussels.
- Mar. '15 'Pulling Together the UN System in Conflict-Prone States: Problems and Prospects?' Palais des Nations, Geneva.
- Oct. '14 'Measuring Peace Consolidation', Wilton Park, *Steving, West Sussex*
- Apr. '14 UN Peacebuilding Contact Group and UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group, *New York, NY*
- Oct. '13 The Peacebuilding Commission's Engagement and Impact, Greentree Estate Retreat, *New York, NY*
- Feb. '13 Conflict- and Fragility-Focused Financing Instruments, United Nations, *New York, NY*
- Oct. '12 UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group Meeting, *New York, NY*
- May '12 International Peace Institute (IPI), *New York, NY*
- May '12 United States Institute of Peace (USIP), *Washington, DC*
- May '12 Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), United Nations, *New York, NY*
- Sept. '10 United Nations Senior Peacebuilding Group (SPG), *New York, NY*
- Apr. '10 Geneva Peacebuilding Platform Consultative Workshop for PBF Review, *Geneva*
- Feb. '10 United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), *New York, NY*
- Oct. '09 UN System Staff College, UNSSC, *Turin*
- Sept. '09 Swisspeace Foundation, *Bern*
- Sept. '09 Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, *Geneva*
- June '09 United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), *Bujumbura, Burundi*
- May '09 International Peace Institute, *New York, NY*
- Oct. '08 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *New York, NY*
- Oct. '03 International Alert Workshop on Conflict Sensitivity, *Negombo, Sri Lanka*
- Mar. '03 The Great Lakes Policy Forum (GLPF), *Washington, DC*

### **PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

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Africa Studies Association (ASA); American Political Science Association (APSA); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR); European International Studies Association (EISA); International Studies Association (ISA); Peace Science Society; Swiss Political Science Association (SVPW); Women in International Security (WIIS).

### **SERVICE TO THE DISCIPLINE**

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External Peer Reviewer for:

*European Journal of Development Research; International Political Sociology (IPS); International Studies Quarterly (ISQ); Global Governance; Journal of International Relations and Development; Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding; Journal of Peacebuilding and Development; Millennium: Journal of*

*International Studies; Politics & Gender; Review of International Organizations (RIO); Review of International Studies (RIS);* Routledge; and United States Institute of Peace Press.

Advisory Board Member of:

Field Research and Ethics in Difficult Settings Website, Colgate University.

Organized panels for:

American Political Science Association (APSA): 2009, 2011; 2015;

European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General Conference: 2011; and

International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015.

Discussant or Chair for:

International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention: 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014;

Political Economy of International Organizations (PEIO) Conference: 2011;

Political Science Colloquium, The Graduate Institute: 2014;

Switzerland High Level Symposium in Preparation for the Development Cooperation Forum: 2013; and

Swiss Political Science Association Annual Meeting: 2014.

Co-Chair and Founder, *Fletcher Doctoral Conference*, Tufts University, Fall 2007.

Ph.D. Colloquium Co-Chair and Moderator, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Fall 2005.

## **RESEARCH SKILLS**

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### *Research skills*

*Field research* – ethnographic methods; household surveys; survey experiments; semi-structured interviews

*Research design* – multi-method (quantitative and qualitative) research designs; comparative cross-national and sub-national case study design

*Data analysis* – content analysis; process tracing; regression

*Software* - Stata, SPSS, and Atlas.ti

### *Field research locations*

Burundi (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2013)

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2015)

Kenya (1999, 2000)

Rwanda (1999)

Sudan (2015)

South Sudan (2015)

Tanzania (1999, 2000)

Timor-Leste (2008)

Uganda (1999)

### *Languages*

English: native

French: excellent spoken proficiency, intermediary written proficiency

German: basic proficiency

## REFERENCES

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### **Prof. Séverine Autesserre**

Associate Professor  
Department of Political Science  
Barnard College  
Columbia University  
3009 Broadway  
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### **Prof. Michael G. Findley**

Associate Professor  
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Austin, Texas 78712  
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### **Prof. Ravi Bhavnani**

Professor and Head of Department  
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### **Prof. Peter S. Uvin**

Dean of the Faculty and  
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